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Introduction
Initial public offering (IPO) is the fi rst sale of stock by a private fi rm to the public (Cliff & Denis, 2004 ). IPO's are often issued by smaller, nascent companies, seeking capital to expand, but they are also common amongst large, privately-owned companies willing to become publicly traded (Ghosh, 2001) .
In an IPO, the issuer obtains the assistance of underwriters in determining what category of security to issue (common or preferred), the timing of bringing it to the market, and the best offering price (Marrison, 2002) . Loughran and Ritter (2002) report that between 1990-1998, 3,025 US fi rms invested over 27 billion dollars in order to become publicly traded. This phenomenon has attracted many authors who have over the years attempted to explain it. Ritter (2003) for instance, found that the average first day yield of IPOs in the USA was 15.8%. According to this analysis, the average annual yield of all IPOs in the USA in most years was positive. Stability in excess fi rst-day yields is the main reason for the scholarly as well as hands-on analysts' interest in this phenomenon. This phenomenon is not unique to the USA and according to Ritter (2003) typifi es other countries. First day yields varied from 5.4% in Denmark (Hale & Santos, 2006) to 257% in China (Kao et al., 2009 ) with a median of 18.4% and 20.7% average yields for all nations.
Authors have raised several reasons for under-pricing. Akerlof (1970) was amongst the first to investigate this phenomenon suggesting that in cases of asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, buyers request a discount on the product cost because they are apprehensive lest they purchase an inferior product. Consequently, discount on initial issuance, results in under-pricing that generates, in turn excess fi rst day yields. Later, Allen and Faulhaber (1989) hypothesized that firms' under-pricing prior to initial issuance indicates the firm's financial robustness.
A model in which executives elect to generate under-pricing in initial issue thus creating excess fi rst-day yield in order to generate a momentum of positive information, is offered by Aggarwal et al. (2002b) . This positive momentum is engendered by higher media interest and analysts' coverage because both prefer to deal with firms that display the most extreme performance. This positive momentum will push prices upwards, thus enable the selling of shares in prices higher than the price they would have received had they sold their shares during the initial issue even if it had been executed by quoting higher prices. Owners, according to Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) , decide about the first-day yield indirectly in accordance with their holdings in the company and the number of shares they wish to issue. Owners may opt for a highly reputed underwriter and hence reduce under-pricing (Demers & Joos, 2007) , but this would normally raise fees. In case owners decide to issue a small portion of the company shares, the cost of under-pricing is likely to be lower than the cost of qualitative underwriting. Pertinently, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) hypothesize that during the hi-tech bubble, owners chose to issue a relatively small number of the company shares at lower prices expecting to sell their shares following a noticeable upswing in share prices prior to the end of the 'hot market'. These activities were fuelled by analysts' optimistic forecasts according to Brous, Datar and Kini (2009) , and traders who prodded their customers to purchase shares. Lowry and Schwert (2004) , argue in this vein that not updating the price of offers according to the accumulated information prior to issue does not amount to inefficiency on the part of underwriters since price adjustment is undertaken by investors. The impact of information available to the public on first day yields is negligible (Alexander et al., 2000) . A thorough examination of the US market between 1980 -2003 (Loughran & Ritter, 2004 shows that fi rst-day yields fl uctuate dramatically between periods such that a yield of 7% in the 1980s doubled to 15% in the 1990s, reaching an all-time high of 65% between 1999-2000 (internet bubble) following which yields dropped to just 12%. Additionally, during the Internet bubble the percentage of managerial ownership in their firms rose twofold, apparently because they attempted to generate a positive momentum in order to realize their holdings at a better price (Boyer, 2005) .
An example of this exuberance is the large fi rst-day yields to Internet IPOs, which averaged over 80% (Loughran & Ritter, 2004) . However, 88% of Internet companies reported negative earnings in the year prior to their IPO, 91% of these fi rms had accumulated defi cits, and many Internet fi rms did not even have revenues at the time of their IPOs (Bhattacharya et al., 2009: 4) Another explanation for excess yields during the bubble years is that raising under-pricing was in fact an indirect payment for underwriters who increased issue coverage in financial markets. This pertained mostly to unprofitable startups that issued during the bubble years (Dolvin & Pyles, 2009; Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003) . Hanleya and Wilhelm (1995) argued that the main benefactors from short-term excess yields arising from initial issue are institutional investors who are often favored by underwriters. On top of the increased profi t, institutional investors are expected to partake in 'inferior' issue, hence inferior issue are subsidised by more profitable ones. A positive relationship was found by Aggarwal et al. (2002a) between institutional investors and fi rst-day yield. Part of this association is explained by the allocation of more shares to institutional investors in initial issuance typifi ed by high early demand and the fact that these investors have valuable information that prompts them to take part in successful issue.
Much like in excess fi rst-day yields, underperformed yield is expected in the long-run (Ritter, 1998) . Long-term underperformed yield has been common in most countries over a considerable length of time. For instance, Ritter (1991) found that IPOs had under-performing yield that equalled 83.1% of the average market yield.
Under-performing yield mostly characterizes IPOs in years of highly active IPO market. This is because investors tend to be optimistic at certain times concerning nascent fi rms' income potential and these fi rms tend to capitalise on these windows of opportunity.
Exploring long-term yields, Dimovski and Brooks (2004) found over-optimism accompanying IPOs as shown by excess yields which decline thereafter into under-performing yield. A later study, however (Eckbo & Norli, 2005) investigating NASDAQ IPOs between 1973-2002, shows that considering the firms' risk and financial leverage factors IPOs' yields equal market yields. Pastor et al. (2006) studied 7,183 IPOs in the USA between 1975-2004. They found that, on average, fi rms' profi tability declines following IPO and further, this decline was more significant amongst firms characterized by fluctuating profi tability. Pastor et al. (2006) argue that the owners elect to undertake IPO at the zenith of their fi rms' profi tability when they sense a looming decline. Owners gain highest yield on their holdings when selling the company whilst it is most profi table notably in light of an expected decline in its market capitalization (Zingales, 1995) . Pagano et al. (1998) indicated that the probability for a fi rm's IPOs is positively associated with the value of other fi rms of the same industry. This relationship is explained by the owners attempt to take advantage of erroneous pricing for the firm's market capitalization which is evidently affected by the relevant industry's trends in the market.
Cyclicality of 'hot' and 'cold' markets is widely discussed in the finance literature (cf. Derrien, & Womack, 2003; Freybote, Rottke & Schiereck, 2008) . A hot market is characterised according to Ljungqvist, Vikram and Singh (2006) by an excess of IPOs and continuous upsurge of trade indicators and volumes. Conventionally, a fi rm's decision concerning IPO timing is motivated by its willingness to minimize errors in its pricing (Alti, 2005) . A hot market eventuates as a result of the confl uence of several characteristics each of which is crucial in determining the value of fi rms. Available information and reduced uncertainty make IPOs less costly for upcoming companies (Lee, Bach & Baik, 2011) . High offers for breakthrough companies induce additional IPOs. As time goes by, however, the quality of firms opting for IPOs in hot markets tend to decline.
As a whole, firms undertaking IPOs do so regardless of market conditions only for the sake of investment whilst firms opting for IPOs in hot markets do so in order to capitalize on the unique market circumstances amenable for mobilizing funds that are used mostly to service existing debt. In this vein, Benninga et al. (2005) indicate that fi rms tend to issue when share prices are high and this refl ects the existence of same industry IPO aggregates. In contrast, when shares prices are low, fi rms tend to repurchase shares with the view of going public.
In accordance with the classic model, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2004) found that in times of low interest rates fi rms are predisposed to delay IPOs.
The Israeli scene
There are several reasons making the IPO market in Israel unique. First, compared with most other developed economies the Israeli IPO market is typifi ed with disproportionally high number of hi-tech fi rms (Avnimelech & Teubal, 2004) . In general the Israeli money market is globally oriented and subsequently many Israeli hi-tech fi rms (and others) are traded both domestically and in foreign stock exchanges notably NASDAQ (Hashai, 2011) . Also, most Israeli companies involved in IPO's, invest heavily in R&D (Blass & Yafeh, 2001) .
The Israeli money market has been structurally reformed such that as of 2006 ownership and management of provident, mutual and pension funds and underwriting were separated from the banks. This reform has enhanced competition of the public's fi nancial assets by developing alternative investment vehicles to those offered by banks, and by decentralising the management of existing investment vehicles. It has also augmented competition in credit provision by developing non-bank credit instruments (Sokoler, 2006: 250) . This structural reform constitutes an integral part of a comprehensive set of governmental policies designed to engender a more competitive and effi cient capital market. These policies include the sale of new pension funds, the downsizing of issues of "earmarked" bonds (e.g. long governmental bonds with guaranteed yields), the equalization of tax rates on capital gains from foreign securities with those on domestic securities, and others (Ministry of Finance, 2004) .
Consequently, we argue that IPO's in Israel are closely linked to the aforementioned structural reform that has altered taxing and so the Israeli market is evidently exposed to foreign money markets. When an Israeli or foreign fi rm does IPO the price it gets in the issuing is closer to the fi rm's real value, thus the Israeli IPO market is potentially attractive to foreign fi rms as they are likely to get a higher price at IPO's.
This study aims at measuring and explaining first-day yields and yearly yield in Israel. First-day yield is defi ned as the rate of change in the price of issuance unit on the fi rst day following issuance where this yield is adjusted to the share index. Yearly yield is defi ned as the rate of change in share price as of the end of the fi rst business day until a year after business has begun Our study is the fi rst to examine this unique period in Israel and it extends the number of parameters measured compared with previous studies addressing the Israeli scene.
Considerable differences exist between the 1980s and the 2000s with respect to periods of fi rst-day yields. Barniv and Chen (1986) found the concrete yields at the fi rst week of trade to be 42%. Amihud et al (2003) report that in the early 1990s, average fi rst-day yield was 12%. Thus far, no study has explored more recent data.
We will provide information regarding first-day rate of yield and will explain changes in the fi rst-day yields with respect to changes in the Israeli Stock Exchange and the IPOs market in particular.
Type of tenders
Two types of tenders are common in Israel, tender on price and on fi xed price. Kandel et al. (1999 ) using Dec. 1993 and Dec. 1996 data found that under the fi xed price tender, fi rst day yields are lower compared to the price system. Of the 284 IPOs between Nov. 1989 and Nov. 1993, Amihud et al. (2003) found that tenders based on price were prevalent in 86% of the IPOs. Pertinently, Hauser et al. (2006) indicate that until 1993, tenders on price were bound by a limit on minimum and maximum prices. In fact, actual price equaled either the minimum or maximum price, aside from a few cases where an intermediate price was set. As of Dec. 1993, the Israel Securities Authority prohibited the fi xing of maximum prices. This decision stemmed from the accumulation of maximum price offerings that resulted in investors gaining a small portion of the orders which reached an all time high in 1993 (Amihud et al., 2003) . This regulatory decision enabled, in turn, the research of maximum price effects on the results of issue and first-day yields. However small, following the removal of maximum price, underpriced offerings still yielded positive fi rst-day yields (4.6%).
Method

Data
Data for this study are based on fi rms that were engaged in IPOs at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange between 1 January 1998 and 30 April 2006 as specifi ed by the Stock Market Authority.
The sampled period was divided into two well characterized sub-periods in terms of the share market in Israel and IPO characteristics at the time.
The 1998-2000 period, or the 'Hi-Tech Bubble', was characterized by infl ated prices and a relatively high number of start ups partaking in issue, 58% as opposed to 36% in the preceding period. The repercussions of the hi-tech bubble were severe, such that until the end of 2003 only fi ve IPOs were carried out as opposed to 33 in 2000 and 19 in 2004. During the sampled period, 122 IPOs were carried out, of which we had full information on 111 (Table 1) .
Model and estimation
Data analyses for each issuance refer to two periods; fi rst trading day or fi rst-day yield and annual yield.
First day yield was calculated according to equation (1) below; as the yield between the price determined at issue and the price of the issue unit's overall closure at the end of the fi rst trading day adjusted to the shares index.
(1)
Yearly yield
Yearly yield is calculated according to equation 2 below, based on buying a share at the end of the fi rst trading day and holding on to it for a year adjusted to the share index.
price 365
Adjusting to the share index
The yields measured (fi rst-day and yearly) are adjusted to the Israeli capital market performance in order to neutralize exogenous effects that included the entire market and not unique to fi rms issuing for the fi rst time. The General Share Index provides the best approximation. 46% of the fi rms may be regarded as hi-tech associated with the Tel-Tech. This index includes all hi-tech fi rms whose market capitalization was higher than 80 million NIS. The high concentration of fi rms from one industry implies that the results are liable to be biased owing to industry effect. A comparison between hi-tech fi rms and all the rest is shown in fi gure 1 in which the Tel-Tech and the General Share Index are compared. Both indices differ between 1999-2001 and 2004-2006. To overcome this bias and on top of evaluating fi rst-day and yearly yields by adjusting to the General Share Index, we further checked the yields of firms unaffiliated with the hi-tech industry by adjustment to the General Share Index and hi-tech fi rms were adjusted to the Tel-Tech Index. We did not adjust the entire sample to the corresponding industry indices because several industries did not have specifi c indices and the relatively low number of non-hi-tech fi rms in our sample. Elliot & Schaub, 2008) . The opposite applies to the 2001-2006 period when the fi rst-day yield is negative, whilst the yearly yield is 10.5%. Correspondingly, the standard deviation of the fi rst-day yield is small as opposed to higher STD for the yearly yield.
Data analysis
Mean yearly yield for 1998-2000 under performed by -33%. Mean yearly yield for [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] showed an excess of 10.5% contrary to previous studies. After adjusting the hi-tech fi rms' yield to the Tel-Tech Index, the mean fi rst-day yield remained identical for the entire sample, but the yearly yield improved from underperformance of −33.3% between 1998-2000 to −12%. The excess yearly yield between 2001-2006 grew from 10.5% to 17.2%. The mean yearly yield for the entire sample grew from underperformance of −10% to an excess yield of 3.6%, contrary to most reported fi ndings in the literature.
The highest fi rst-day yield was recorded in 1999 (8.5%) prior to the bubble as opposed to a much lower yield of 1.4% in 2000. Underperformance was recorded after 2000 (−1.4%-−3.4%) with a minute excess yield of 0.4% in 2006.
Econometric estimation -fi rst day yield
We estimated two equations. In the first equation, the dependent variable was daily yield of stocks engaged in IPOs at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange between 1 January 1998 and 30 April 2006, adjusted to the shares index (Re1). In the second equation, hi-tech stocks engaged in IPOs were adjusted to the High-Tech Share Index whilst the rest of the stocks were adjusted to General Shares Index (Re1_hi).
After examining several versions and removing non-signifi cant variables (at 10% level of signifi cance) we reached estimation results presented in table 3 below: Surprisingly, the dummy variable for the 1998-2000 issue and the dummy 2001-2006 issue were not found to be signifi cant. This despite the fact that average market yield differed markedly within the two time periods.
We examined several companies' characteristics as explanatory variables, but found that only companies' share capital proved statistically signifi cant. We also examined funds raised relative to total assets and relative to share capital, but they too were not proved statistically signifi cant. The dummy variable representing the participation of institutional investors at the issue was not found to be signifi cant.
Our fi ndings show that factors effecting positively fi rst-day yield are fixed-price tender, high-tech companies' issue, last month general index yield, underwriting issue, and companies' share capital, while factors affecting negatively fi rst-day yield are underwriter fee, price of issue unit and sum raised.
Econometric estimation -yearly yield
As in the case of the fi rst-day yield, we estimated two equations. In the fi rst equation' the dependent variable is the yearly yield of stocks engaged in IPOs at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (hereafter TASE) between 1 January 1998 and 30 April 2006 adjusted to the shares index (re365). In the second equation, hi-tech stocks engaged in IPOs were adjusted to the High-Tech Share Index whilst the rest of stocks were adjusted to General Shares Index (re365_hi).
Following several iterations and removing non-signifi cant variables (at 10% level), we reached the estimation results presented in table 4 below.
We examined several companies' characteristics as explanatory variables but only Return on Equity (RoE) was found to be signifi cant.
Underwriting fee, the number of underwriters, a dummy variable representing issue between 2001 -2006 , and a dummy variable representing issue of mixed units were not found to be signifi cant.
Our fi ndings show that factors affecting fi rst year yield positively are underwriters, partial underwriting (inability to underwrite all units), whilst factors affecting negatively fi rst-year yield are issue between 1998-2000 and RoE.
Summary
The literature addressing IPO's shows that when a company fi rst becomes public, it offers its shares to the public at reduced prices which, on average, results in excess return on the fi rst-day of trade compared to the market, and on the other hand, defi cient return in the long-run.
The literature concerning Israel's IPO indicates a declining tendency in fi rst-day returns from an excess return of 42% during the 1980's to 12% in the early 1990's which continues to decline until reaching an excess return of approximately 4.6% in the late 1990's. This paper is the fi rst to examine the IPO market in Israel between 1998 -2006 . During 2001 -2006 , the average fi rst-day returns resulted in a defi cit return of −1.2% and the average one-year return resulted in an excess return of 10.5%, contrary to the conventional returns reported in the literature. The fi rst-day return for the entire period amounted to an excess of 1.2% and the average one-year return for the entire period of the sample resulted in a defi cit return of −10%.
The high concentration of Hi-Tech companies raised the possibility of diverting the industry. In order to address this diversion, additional testing was conducted where returns of companies outside the high-tech industry were adjusted to the General Share Index and the returns of companies included in the Hi-Tech industry were adjusted to the Tel-Tech Index. After adjusting the returns of the H-Tech companies to the Tel-Tech Index, the average fi rst-day return remained identical for the entire sample, yet the one-year return improved continuously overtime -from a deficit return of −33.3% in 1998-2000 to −12% in 2001-2006 and the excess one-year return during 2001-2006 increased from 10.5% to 17.2%. The average one-year return for the entire sample increased from defi cit returns of −10% to an excess return of 3.6%, contrary to most fi ndings reported in the literature. We econometrically estimated the relationship between the yields (fi rst-day and yearly) and various company-related explanatory variables and to market activities.
First-year yield was found to increase with underwriters associated with the company and with partial underwriting (inability to underwrite all units), whilst factors affecting negatively over yearly yield are issuance at 1998-2000 and ROE, a rather surprising fi nding.
The fi ndings show that fi rst-day yield is positively affected by the fi xed-price tender, issue of hi-tech fi rms, General Index yield in the last month, over underwriting of issuance, and the companies' share capital, while factors resulting in negative effect over the fi rst day yield are underwriter fee, price of issue unit and the sum raised.
We found that contrary to previous studies addressing the Israeli IPO market and studies addressing a broad range of international markets, underpricing is not found in this study. This we believe may be explicated by several factors. First, the Israeli money market has been structurally reformed over the past decade. Banks are no longer allowed by the regulator to manage pension, provident and mutual funds and notably underwriting. In addition, the reform equalized tax rates over local and foreign fi nancial investments, which largely increased competition at the stock market. Second, the Israel's industrial structure differs markedly from most other developed economies specifi cally owing to a disproportionately high number of hi-tech and R&D-intensive fi rms. A fair number of the fi rms, chiefl y hi-tech, are sold in-turn to global companies at high returns and therefore pricing is higher at the issue.
Third, most Israeli IPO's are characterized by excess underwriting which might positively affect the price.
